An increasingly popular instrument for solving
Introduction
For many years environmental regulators have relied upon various forms of taxes, subsidies and command and control regulations to remedy environmental problems. Recently, however, a new tool has been added to the regulator's tool box, namely voluntary environmental agreements. Most voluntary agreements fall into one of three categories: unilateral agreements, public voluntary agreements, and negotiated agreements. Unilateral agreements refer to self-regulatory actions in which …rms (usually belonging to an industry trade association) initiate a public pledge to improve their environmental performance. Under public voluntary agreements, participating …rms agree to make good faith e¤orts to meet program goals established by the regulatory agency; in return, they may receive technical assistance and/or favorable publicity from the government. In a negotiated voluntary agreement, the regulator and a …rm or industry group jointly set environmental goals and the means of achieving them; such agreements consequently tend to be heterogeneous in nature.
Because voluntary agreements have arisen quite recently, and because they have been developed by practitioners rather than academics, their properties are less well understood than those of the standard regulatory tools. A small but growing academic literature, both theoretical and empirical, has developed in which various aspects of voluntary agreements have been studied. However, the existing literature generally fails to distinguish clearly between the di¤erent forms of voluntary agreements described above. The present paper develops a model of corporate and government behavior in which unilateral agreements, taxation, and public voluntary agreements can be considered in one uni…ed framework. In so doing, we sharpen the discussion of voluntary agreements by distinguishing carefully between unilateral agreements and public voluntary agreements.
The literature on unilateral corporate voluntary environmental actions suggests that the preemption of stricter future regulations is a leading motivation for such actions. 1 This motivation has also been used to explain corporate participation in voluntary environmental agreements between corporations and environmental regulators. We begin by reviewing the political history of the U.S. Climate Change Action Program (CCAP), which has spawned numerous public voluntary agreements. We …nd that the CCAP and its progeny arose in the absence of any serious regulatory threats. These programs o¤er participants a variety of modest bene…ts, including information about projects undertaken by other …rms, and performance and cost data on energy e¢ciency products sold by a variety of vendors. The chief regulatory bene…t appears to have been the improvement in the environmental performance of at least a portion of the industry when statutory authority for mandatory environmental standards did not exist.
We incorporate these insights into a three-stage game which features both the possibility of unilateral corporate voluntary e¤orts aimed at legislative preemption, and the possibility of a voluntary environmental agreement when legislative e¤orts fail. The model features a continuum of …rms-di¤erentiated according to their abatement costs-which produce a homogeneous good sold at a …xed price, and a welfare-maximizing environmental regulator.
Firms have the option of adopting an environmental technology that eliminates all environmental externalities. In the …rst stage of the game, …rms choose a level (possibly zero) of voluntary adoption. In the second stage of the game, after observing the unilateral adoptions by the industry, the regulator chooses whether to propose new legislation that would impose a pollution tax. 3 If the proposal is made, it is put to Congress and passes with some probability less than one. If legislation is successful, the regulator imposes a constrained welfare-maximizing pollution tax. Firms that did not choose voluntary abatement in stage one may now decide to adopt the technology and avoid paying the tax, or they may choose not to abate and thereby incur the tax. If legislative e¤orts fail, the regulator has the option of proposing a voluntary agreement, which is implemented by subsidizing …rms' technology adoptions through the use of costly public funds. The level of subsidies is set so as to maximize social welfare.
Our model generates both positive and normative implications. We identify conditions under which industries will undertake self-regulation, and we identify which …rms are most likely to participate in public voluntary programs. We also examine in detail the relative merits of taxation and voluntary agreements from the regulator's perspective; in particular, we show that the regulator is better o¤ imposing a tax rather than a VA unless political opposition to the tax is high. The chief normative …ndings are surprising: public VAs can reduce welfare by increasing industry resistance to socially bene…cial tax proposals and by reducing industry incentives to engage in welfare-enhancing self-regulation.
The following section discusses in some detail the political backdrop of many US public voluntary agreements, setting the stage for the overview of our modeling approach, which is presented in section 3. Our analysis of the model is conducted in two separate sections of the paper. Section 4 studies the regulator's choice between proposing a tax and proposing a public voluntary agreement. Section 5 examines the industry's decision regarding selfregulation, and how that a¤ects the regulator's policy decisions. Section 6 concludes.
Politics and Public Voluntary Agreements
In this section we provide details of the political backdrop to many U.S. public voluntary environmental agreements and review a related case study of corporate behavior developed by the International Academy of the Environment (IAE). Both of these serve to illustrate the use of public voluntary agreements in the absence of regulatory threats. 4 For a broader institutional analysis of the use of public voluntary agreements, see .
Background to U.S. Public Voluntary Agreements
In her survey of U.S. voluntary environmental agreements (VAs), Mazurek (1998) identi…es 9 unilateral agreements, 31 public voluntary schemes, and 2 negotiated agreements. Of the public voluntary schemes, the majority arose from the Clinton Administration's Climate Change Action Plan, which we examine in detail below. We argue that these schemes share several important features: 1) They can be implemented at little or no cost to at least some subset of …rms, 2) They arose in an area in which the regulatory authorities did not have a statutory mandate to require any actions, and 3) The heterogeneity of the o¤enders would have made command and control regulation complex and costly for regulators to administer. 5 Most of the climate change VAs aim to increase investments in energy e¢ciency. Energy e¢ciency has been supported by the US government, through a variety of programs, since the 1970s. Most of these emphasize the private bene…ts to …rms and individuals of adopting energy e¢cient equipment, and attempt to solve the "market failures" that limit the spread of these technologies. The climate change VAs were begun under the Bush Administration after President Bush promised to be the "environmental president." Most of them, however, 4 The interested reader is encouraged to consult IAE (1998) for case details. 5 Our characterization of these programs has been shaped by interviews with a number of current and former EPA o¢cials: James Barnes, former Assistant Administrator; Bill Rosenberg, former Assistant Administrator for Air during the Bush Administration; Linda Fisher, former director, O¢ce of Pesticides and Toxic Substances and O¢ce of Pollution Prevention; and Skip Laitner, director, O¢ce of Atmospheric Programs. We thank all of these individuals for their gracious cooperation.
were promulgated as part of the Clinton Administration's e¤orts to achieve reductions in greenhouse gases after the "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.
In most cases, there does not appear to have been a substantial regulatory "threat" driving the adoption of VAs. In our conversations with current and former EPA o¢cials, none mentioned such threats as important to the creation of VAs, while all pointed out that VAs were typically used by EPA when the agency had no statutory authority to take formal regulatory actions. Global warming provides a particularly interesting case in point. The
Bush Administration opposed strong actions to combat global warming, and was publicly derided by US environmental groups and by most other nations of the world for its refusal at the "Earth Summit" to agree to a timetable with speci…c targets for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. Senator Al Gore was among the Administration's harshest critics, and proposed a carbon tax to combat global warming.
After President Clinton was elected in November of 1992, one of his early actions was to announce support for stronger measures to prevent climate change. In the early months of 1993, his administration ‡oated a variety of proposals to tax energy, including a carbon tax and a broader-based "BTU tax" based on the energy content of fuels as measured in British Thermal Units. The political response was fast and powerful: the plan placed too much emphasis on voluntary measures, "with no prospect of hammers or sticks to bring us into compliance if those don't work." 7 Released in October 1993, the President's Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) embodies the Clinton Administration's commitment to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. 8 The plan is based on the premise that government and private enterprise can work together to achieve program goals without harming the econ- This section has attempted to make two key points that are developed more fully in the model of the succeeding sections. First, public voluntary agreements are often proposed in the absence of strong legislative threats; indeed, regulatory authorities often use such agreements precisely because they lack statutory authority to undertake more stringent measures.
Second, companies join public voluntary agreements in order to obtain the (admittedly modest) bene…ts o¤ered to participants by the government. Such agreements can thus be viewed as subsidies from government to …rms, aimed at inducing environmentally-friendly actions by the participating …rms. 7 William K. Stevens, "U.S. Prepares to Unveil Blueprint for Reducing Heat-Trapping Gases," New York Times, October 12, 1993, page C4. 8 This goal, of course, was not actually achieved. 9 For details on these and the other programs introduced under the CCAP, see U.S. O¢ce of Global Change (1997).
Model Overview
Drawing on the insights into public voluntary agreements presented in Section 2, we develop a three-stage game played by a regulator and the …rms in an industry. In order to distinguish between unilateral and public voluntary agreements, we allow the …rms in stage 1 to decide whether or not to unilaterally adopt an environmental technology based on the decision's impact on expected industry pro…ts. In stage 2, the regulator decides whether to propose an environmental tax, and sets its level, ¿. In stage 3, if the regulator chooses not to propose a tax, or if the proposed tax is not passed by the legislature, the regulator may propose a public voluntary agreement involving a subsidy s, paid for by raising costly public funds.We purposely do not assume that voluntary actions are cheaper than actions mandated by law, as doing so would make it too easy to reach simplistic conclusions about the superiority of voluntary measures. We also assume away the possibility of "win/win" solutions in which the adoption of environmentally-friendly technology lowers cost; economic analysis is not needed to conclude that these actions are desirable, nor are subsidies required to induce adoption.
The basic set up of our model is based on Lewis (1996) . The industry consists of a group of domestic …rms that supply an export product that sells at a …xed world price. 10 Firms, which are indexed by µ, di¤er according to their pro…tability and their …xed costs of adopting an environmental technology, which is assumed to eliminate all environmental costs associated with production. We assume µ is distributed over [µ; µ] with cumulative density F (µ). (The simplest interpretation of µ is as an e¢ciency parameter.) We denote by ¼ (µ) the gross pro…ts of a …rm of type µ, and we assume that ¼ 0 (µ) > 0, where the 0 indicates the …rst derivative. Similarly, c (µ) is the …xed adoption cost of the environmental technology for a …rm of type µ, and we assume c 0 (µ) < 0.
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Further, we assume there exists
We assume each operating …rm emits pollutants that impose an external cost on domestic consumers of x > 0. The net social welfare generated by …rm µ prior to the adoption of the environmental technology is ¼ (µ) ¡ x. Absent adoption of the environmental technology, the optimal size of the industry is de…ned by µ
10 By assuming a competitive global market we leave out consideration of "green consumers." While this is clearly an interesting issue, we eschew it in order to keep our model tractable and because green consumers are arguably fairly unimportant in many markets, especially those for intermediate products. discuss, the empirical support for the notion that green consumerism drives corporate environmental e¤orts is mixed at best. 11 The idea is that …rms with a high value of the e¢ciency parameter µ have high pro…ts due to lower costs, and that their higher e¢ciency will also translate into lower costs of adopting the new technology. This is consistent with the observation that …rms undertaking voluntary actions are often the larger, more pro…table members of an industry.
In an unregulated equilibrium entry will occur until gross pro…ts are driven to zero. This will cause excessive entry from a social viewpoint and the welfare-maximizing regulator will wish to act to prevent or remedy this outcome. This may be done by the imposition of a tax ¿ set equal to the social cost of pollution. (The cost of implementing the tax is assumed to be a …xed amount K.) Any …rm with costs c (µ) < ¿ will undertake the environmental investment and avoid paying the tax. As Lewis (1996) points out, however, …rms have a strong incentive to oppose the tax even if it is set at the optimal level. Let ¢ (¿ ) be the aggregate costs imposed on the industry by a tax, and P (¢) be the probability that a tax will pass the legislature if it would impose aggregate costs of ¢. We assume P (¢) is declining in ¢ at an increasing rate. Like Lewis, we focus on the aggregate losses imposed on the industry, and abstract from issues of coalition formation within the industry; we thus implicitly assume the industry is able to coordinate its political actions through the use of tools such as a trade association or side payments.
In the absence of a tax, the regulator may propose a public voluntary agreement to encourage the adoption of the environmental technology. We assume the cost of implementing the voluntary agreement is the same as the cost of implementing the tax, so as not to have our results hinge on exogenous di¤erences in the cost of the two programs. As we have illustrated in Section 2, many public voluntary agreements contain features which serve to subsidize the cost of corporate environmental actions. Thus, we follow Carraro and Siniscalco (1996) in modeling the public voluntary agreement as a subsidy, s; set optimally by the regulator, which is payable to any …rm that adopts the environmental technology. Note that a public VA is a specialized form of subsidy, which can only be collected by …rms that stay in business and participate in the VA program. Lewis models an optimal subsidy that is also collected by …rms that reduce their emissions by exiting the industry. VA programs, however, are not optimal subsidies, since only …rms that join the program can bene…t from it.
We assume the subsidies paid by the regulatory authorities involve costly public funds.
In addition, we assume …rms that adopted the environmental technology before the public voluntary agreement was established cannot be excluded from receiving the bene…ts of participating in the voluntary agreement, an assumption that is consistent with government practice in the public voluntary programs described in section 2.
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To highlight the distinction between public voluntary agreements and unilateral industry self-regulation, we include a …rst stage of the game in which some subset of …rms may unilaterally adopt the environmental technology. In so doing, we generalize the work of Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000) by incorporating heterogeneous …rms and the possibility of a public voluntary agreement o¤ered by the regulator. As discussed above, we follow Lewis (1996) in treating the industry as working in concert in its political e¤orts; we extend that assumption to the coordination of self-regulatory activity as well. 
The Regulator's Choice between Taxation and a VA
In this section, we focus on the regulator's expected welfare when it proposes an environmental tax and when it proposes a public voluntary agreement (VA). We work backward through the game, beginning with the stage 3 decision regarding whether to o¤er a VA, then turning to the stage 2 decision regarding taxation. Note that the regulator only faces these policy choices in the event that the industry's unilateral actions are not su¢cient to preempt government action. Furthermore, as we show in section 5, the industry will either choose a preemptive level of unilateral action or none at all. Hence, throughout this section we assume the industry engages in no unilateral voluntary action, i.e., µ v = µ: As a reference point, we note that if government takes no action, social welfare is given by
where ; indicates the absence of government action. technology. The subsidy is chosen to maximize social welfare. Thus, the regulator's problem 13 Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000) study the extent to which coordinated levels of self-regulation can be sustained as non-cooperative Nash equilibria. is to choose s to maximize W (s) ¡ K, where
where¸> 0 indicating that the funds used to subsidize adoption are costly. 14 The …rst term on the right-hand side of (2) Since c (µ s ) = s we have dµ
The …rst order condition of the optimization problem (2) is
Using (3), the solution to …rst-order condition (4) yields:
We use this result to establish the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 When public funds are costly (¸> 0), the optimal subsidy s ¤ is strictly less than the marginal social cost of pollution, x. As a result, too few …rms will adopt the environmental technology.
Proof: Since¸> 0, the …rst term in (5) is strictly less than x. Since c 0 (µ) < 0, the term in parentheses in (5) is negative.¥ Because raising public funds is costly, the public VA captures the "low hanging fruit" but is not powerful enough to reach the social optimum. At the margin, the regulator faces a tradeo¤ between inducing additional participation in the program and paying out additional subsidies to inframarginal …rms that would participate in the program anyway. These factors are illustrated in Figure 1 . The bene…t of the program is represented by the lightly shaded
The cost of the program is shown by the darker shaded region, which represents the payment s made to all program participants, indexed by µ > µ s : Note that for the VA to be bene…cial, it is important that the cost of adopting the new technology is low relative to the social impact of emissions, so that the bene…ts from the program (the area of the lightly shaded region) are great enough to justify its costs.
As seen in equation (5), as s increases, additional participation is re ‡ected in the term
; while additional payments increase in proportion to the share of participants already in the program,
Combining these components, we see that as the cost of public funds rises, the optimal subsidy falls since
Eventually the optimal subsidy will reach zero, thus eliminating the public voluntary program as a regulatory option. It is also evident that the subsidy will be more distorted when the absolute value of c 0 (µ s ) is large, i.e., when adoption cost varies substantially across …rms. In this case, an increase in the subsidy induces few additional …rms to join the program, yet the rate at which program costs rise is una¤ected; as a result, the subsidy program is less attractive. Overall, a VA will perform better when the cost of public funds is low and the cost of technology adoption does not vary greatly across …rms.
Stage 2: Proposal of an Environmental Tax
In the second stage of the game, the regulator may propose an environmental tax which can be implemented at a cost K . As we detail below, any tax proposal will result in losses to the industry. As a result, industry will oppose even a …rst-best tax, and the optimal tax proposed by the regulator will be distorted away from its …rst-best level.
Industry losses from a tax occur in several di¤erent forms. Let µ ¿ denote the …rm that is just indi¤erent between paying the proposed tax and exiting the industry, i.e., ¼ (µ
All …rms indexed by µ 2 hμ ; µ ¿´w ill exit the industry and their pro…ts will be lost. Denote by µ a the …rm that is just indi¤erent between paying the proposed tax and adopting the environmental technology, i.e., c (µ
All …rms indexed by µ 2 [µ ¿ ; µ a ] will continue operations, but each …rm will incur losses equal to the tax. Firms indexed by µ 2 £ µ a ; ¹ µ ¤ will be induced to adopt the environmental technology at cost c (µ) rather than pay the tax. The sum of these enumerated losses constitutes the total direct costs borne by industry from the tax proposal. However, additional indirect losses are possible due to the loss of potential subsidies from a public voluntary agreement.
Speci…cally, all …rms indexed by µ 2 £ µ s ¤ ; ¹ µ ¤ are eligible to receive the subsidy s ¤ , but will forego this bene…t if the tax is passed. These opportunity costs of a tax must also be taken into account. Thus, industry losses arising from the proposed tax may be written as
Di¤erentiation of (8) con…rms the intuition that industry losses are rising in the tax level. 15 Absent any political opposition, i.e. if P (¢) = 1, the regulator's objective is to maximize
The …rst term on the right hand side of (9) denotes the social value of …rms remaining in the industry and paying the tax after its imposition. The term°¿ captures the bene…t the regulator receives from environmental tax revenues. Note that the marginal bene…t of tax revenues,°, is not necessarily identical to the cost of public funds,¸, 16 and in practice may be quite small. The second term denotes the social value of …rms that adopt the new technology. We assume that welfare is concave in ¿:
The welfare gains from taxation, relative to government inaction, are shown in Figure 2 .
The shaded region between e µ and µ As a benchmark, it is interesting to consider the optimal tax absent political opposition.
In this case, the regulator simply maximizes W (¿) ¡ K, the optimization of which yields
Using (6) and (7) and the facts that ¼ (µ ¿ ) = ¿ and c (µ a ) = ¿ we obtain
15 A proof for the general case in which µ v < ¹ µ is provided in the Appendix.
The …rst term in (10) indicates that the regulator distorts the tax downward, away the marginal pollution damage x, because of the marginal social bene…t°of tax recycling that is obtained from each additional …rm that pays tax. At the margin, however, only the behavior of …rms at µ ¿ and µ a will be changed by a change in the tax rate. The second term (which is positive) re ‡ects the fact that the regulator is tempted to increase the tax to obtain greater tax revenues from the tax base of inframarginal …rms, who are a fraction F (µ a )¡ F (µ ¿ ) of the total set of …rms. However, note the presence of the expression f (µ
in the denominator of the second term. This expression re ‡ects the net change in the size of the tax base as the tax rises. Its presence in the second term shows that the regulator trades o¤ the bene…ts of taxing the base more heavily against the costs of decreasing the size of the base. Because of countervailing forces pressing for downward and upward shifts away from marginal pollution damage x, it cannot be determined in general whether ¿ N 7 x. It is clear, however, that as°goes to zero, a Pigouvian tax becomes optimal, i.e., the regulator sets the environmental tax equal to the environmental damage caused by the marginal …rm.
We have shown that even when political opposition is not an issue, both the VA and the tax are distorted away from the marginal social cost of pollution because of the distortionary e¤ects of raising tax monies. To understand the di¤erences between taxation and VAs more clearly, however, it is helpful to consider the "frictionless" case in which neither tax distortions nor political resistance are present, i.e. when¸=°= 0 and P (¢) = 1. Under these
The following Proposition characterizes the relative performance of the two instruments in this case.
Proposition 1 When regulators are not constrained by the costs of raising subsidy funds or the need to respond to political opposition from industry, i.e. when¸=°= 0 and P (¢) = 1, the optimal pollution tax generates greater social bene…ts than does the optimal public voluntary agreement.
Proof. De…neμ = c ¡1 (x). Then social welfare under the VA is
and social welfare under the tax is
The only di¤erence between these two expressions is that the tax induces exit by …rms with µ 2 [ e µ; µ ¿ ]. These exits are socially bene…cial, since these …rms had pro…ts that were less than the social cost of their emissions.
Proposition 1 shows that the tax is inherently a more powerful instrument than the public VA. As mentioned above, the fundamental limitation of the public VA is that it cannot subsidize …rms to exit the industry; …rms must stay in business in order to collect any bene…ts from the VA program. Thus, a public VA should not be confused with an optimal subsidy program.
In reality, of course, political opposition is important: …rms will oppose a tax since, from (8) industry losses ¢ (¿) are positive for any positive tax. This fact alters the regulator's objective function. Speci…cally, the regulator will optimize the expected bene…ts of the tax,
given that legislation favoring the tax will only pass with probability P (¢) < 1. Thus, in setting the tax the regulator solves the following optimization problem:
where s ¤ is the optimal subsidy to be imposed if the tax does not pass. Substituting (9) into (11) and optimizing we obtain:
Solving for ¿ yields:
Recalling that @ ¢=@¿ > 0; a comparison of this result to (10) shows that political resistance weakens the tax, relative to ¿ N , whenever the regulator prefers the tax over the public voluntary agreement (i.e., whenever
The reason is simple: since the tax is socially bene…cial, the regulator lowers the proposed tax so as to increase its chances of passage. As a result, ¿ ¤ < ¿ N : The extent of the distortion away from ¿ N depends on two new factors that appear in the third term of (12): the elasticity of political resistance with respect to taxation, and the net bene…t of taxation compared to the VA. The tax elasticity of political resistance is the percentage change in resistance divided by the percentage change in tax, i.e.´¡
17 We assume here that K is small enough that the regulator prefers to o¤er the VA rather than to take no action at all. If this were not the case, (12) would be unchanged except that W (s ¤ ) would be replaced by W (Á). Since both of these are less that W (¿ ¤ ), the direction of the tax distortions we discuss below would be unchanged.
Using this de…nition, we see that the …nal term in (12) can be rewritten as (¡´=¿ ). Thus, the political distortion in the tax is greater when´is high, i.e. when the political resistance to a marginal tax increase is strong. As can be seen in the de…nition of´, the tax elasticity is greater when P 0 (¢) is large; the probability of passing a tax, P (¢) ; is small; and when losses rise rapidly with the tax rate, i.e. when @¢(¿ ¤ )=@¿ is large, either because many ine¢cient …rms would be forced to exit, because many moderately e¢cient …rms would resist paying the tax, and/or because many e¢cient …rms would be forced to adopt the costly new technology. In any case, the higher is the tax elasiticy of political resistance, the more the regulator distorts downward the proposed tax.
The second factor causing political tax distortion is that the more the regulator wants the tax, i.e. the greater is
; the more the regulator weakens the tax proposal to increase its chances of passage.
We record these observations in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Political distortion causes the regulator to weaken its tax proposal, i.e. ¿ ¤ < ¿ N :
The distortion increases with the tax elasticity of political pressure and with the net bene…t of taxation compared to the VA.
We have shown that both the VA and the tax are distorted away from the marginal social cost of pollution due to the distortionary e¤ects of raising tax monies and/or political resistance to taxation. Whether the tax produces better results than the VA in practice depends upon a number of parameters. The key parameters a¤ecting each of these instruments have been discussed above. In particular, welfare under a public voluntary agreement improves when the cost of public funds is low and the cost of adoption is low and does not vary greatly across …rms. Welfare under a pollution tax improves when the tax elasticity of political resistance is low, and when innate e¢ciency does not vary greatly across …rms.
In light of the result established in Lemma 2, it is easy to see the following Corollary to Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 Taxation is a preferable regulatory instrument to a public voluntary agreement unless political opposition [1 ¡ P (¢)] is high.
Because taxation works at both the upper and lower end of the e¢ciency distribution of …rms, it is inherently a more powerful instrument than a public VA. As a result, it is preferred to a VA unless the political forces opposing taxation are strong. As discussed in section 2, the Climate Change Action Program appears to be a case where the costs of technology adoption for many …rms were relatively low, but where the political resistance to a tax was high because some …rms would have been forced out of business and a broad base of …rms would have had to pay higher taxes. Thus the public VA proved to be the only feasible policy, even though an energy tax would have been a more potent tool.
As mentioned at the outset of the paper, voluntary programs-despite their inherent weaknesses-are becoming more popular. This is even more true in Europe than in the US.
As OECD (1999) notes: "Despite considerable institutional diversity among European Union member states, an overall pattern of VA use can be identi…ed." It is interesting, therefore, to examine how welfare is a¤ected when the regulator has the possibility of o¤ering a public VA after legislative e¤orts fail. As the following proposition notes, such an introduction may diminish social welfare and legislatures might wish to commit not to use public VAs to achieve some environmental policy goals.
Proposition 2
If the tax elasticity of political resistance is high, social welfare may be greater if the regulator commits not to o¤er a public VA.
Proof: Consider a reference case in which government either taxes or takes no action.
Expected social welfare is
where ; indicates no action by government. To this reference case compare a case in which the regulator can o¤er a VA if a tax proposal fails, the expected welfare of which is
The bene…t of the latter case is that it is possible that W (s ¤ ) ¡ K > W (;). The cost is that industry losses from a tax-relative to the subsidy o¤ered under a VA-are greater in the latter case, as can be seen in (8) .
As a result, political resistance is greater in the latter case, and P (¢) is smaller. If the tax elasticity´is high enough, the reduced probability of passing tax legislation more than o¤sets the ex post gains from being able to o¤er a VA. In that case, welfare would be higher if the government could pre-commit not to o¤er the VA ex post.¥
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is simple: if …rms know a VA will be o¤ered after a tax fails, they have more incentive to oppose the tax so they can collect the subsidy that is o¤ered under the VA. If the tax elasticity of political opposition is high, o¤ering the VA can produce a signi…cant increase in political resistance to the tax, and greatly reduce the chance that the tax proposal will be passed. If the social bene…ts of the tax are substantially greater than the bene…ts of the VA, then this increased political resistance dominates the bene…ts of the VA, and expected welfare is higher when the possibility of a VA is eliminated.
Note that as K (the cost of o¤ering the VA) rises, the bene…ts of the VA fall, while the costs the subsidy program remain unchanged. Hence, a commitment not to o¤er a VA is more likely to be valuable the larger is K. From a policy perspective, these results suggest a more cautious approach to the use of public VAs than has been espoused by some. 18 
Industry Self-Regulation
The previous section studied stages 2 and 3 of the game, involving the regulator's decision regarding which policy instrument to wield. This section studies the …rst stage of the game, in which the industry decides whether and to what extent it will unilaterally adopt the environmental technology, taking into account how its decision will a¤ect the likelihood and level of the tax, as well as the likelihood of the public voluntary program. Thus we must examine not only the impact of unilateral activities on industry pro…tability, but also on the regulator's response. Because the technical analysis of these e¤ects is involved, and somewhat tedious, the formal analysis is relegated to the appendix. Here we provide the intuition behind the results in a less formal fashion. We examine whether the industry will undertake unilateral self-regulation, and the welfare consequences if self-regulation occurs.
We also study how o¤ering a public VA a¤ects incentives for industry self-regulation.
This section of the paper extends the analysis of Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000) in two main ways. First, we allow for uncertainty regarding the passage of new legislation if no self-regulation occurs. Second, we allow the regulator to employ a VA if legislation does not pass. Thus, we distinguish sharply between unilateral action by industry and a voluntary agreement o¤ered by the government, something that has not been done in previous formal models.
To begin with, we change our notation to make all of our expressions for welfare contingent upon the level of unilateral adoption by industry. As discussed earlier, we imagine the industry working in concert in its preemption e¤orts. Under this assumption, …rms with the lowest technology adoption costs will be the …rst to enter the unilateral voluntary agreement. More formally, the general expression for welfare when the government takes no action is 
If the legislature passes the tax proposal following the voluntary technology adoptions of some …rms, social welfare is given by
Finally, subsequent to some voluntary technology adoption, the expected level of welfare from proposing the optimal tax is
if the level of voluntary adoption has not preempted the public voluntary agreement, and is
otherwise, where the general expression for ¢(¿) is given by equation (22) in the appendix.
For purposes of this section, we assume that ¹ W (¿ ¤ ; µ) > W (s ¤ ; µ), i.e. if there is no unilateral action by the industry, then the regulator prefers to propose a tax rather than institute a public VA. If this were not so, then the industry would have no motive for taking unilateral action. As we show below, unilateral action is unpro…table for the industry unless it serves to preempt government action. While preempting a tax is desirable for the industry, preempting a government handout is not. Hence, if the public VA is preferred by the regulator when µ v = µ, then the industry will take no self-regulatory action.
19 The reader will note that the second and third terms on the right hand side of (14) could be combined so as to eliminate the dependence of the expression on µ v . We keep the two terms independent for notational consistency. All other welfare functions are dependent on µ v and are presented as W (¢; µ v ).
We turn next to the impact of self-regulation on the regulator's bene…ts of o¤ering a public voluntary agreement. The bene…ts of a VA, relative to doing nothing, are 
The left-hand side of (19) These net bene…ts are:
Equation (20) re ‡ects the fact that as long as unilateral voluntary e¤orts do not preempt the public voluntary agreement, the relevant alternative to the tax is the stage 3 agreement.
However if industry unilateral e¤orts do preempt the public voluntary agreement, then the relevant regulatory alternative is one of inaction. Note that both the tax proposal and the VA require the regulator to incur the cost K, so this cost cancels out when one is subtracted from the other. Thus, the …xed cost K appears only in the lower part of (20), and only with probability P (¢), since this cost is only incurred in the event that the tax proposal passes.
Substituting (11) into (20) we see that the regulator's expected net bene…t of taxation may be rewritten as
We have seen that industry has no incentive to engage in unilateral voluntary actions absent a tax. Thus, two possible motivations for unilateral voluntary actions exist. First, unilateral actions that do not preempt the tax might nevertheless raise expected industry pro…ts above those associated with no unilateral voluntary agreement, perhaps by weakening the tax that is eventually proposed. Second, unilateral action might preempt the tax and industry pro…ts following preemption may exceed the expected pro…ts associated with no unilateral voluntary agreement.
We show in the appendix that for su¢ciently small°; µ ¡¿ < µ ¡s , i.e., unilateral abatement will preempt the public VA before it preempts the tax. In addition, the appendix also contains a proof that expected industry pro…ts are increasing in µ
quently, the industry will never engage in unilateral voluntary actions that do not lead to the preemption of the proposed tax. 22 However, it is easy to see that preemption is possible for large enough K. Consider a K large enough that the regulator is almost indi¤erent between proposing a tax and not; in this case, a small amount of voluntary adoption will reduce the incremental bene…t of taxation enough to preempt tax legislation. Denote by µ
that preemption is possible with a smaller amount of unilateral action. While it is clear that for su¢ciently large K voluntary actions will preempt the tax proposal, we must also consider whether preemption is pro…table for the industry. In the appendix we prove the following proposition, which establishes conditions under which feasible preemption is also pro…table.
Proposition 3 If preemption is feasible, it is also pro…table for large enough K .
This result extends that of Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000), who show that preemption is pro…table in a setting where there is no possibility of a public voluntary agreement. The relationship between K and the extent of unilateral action is shown in Figure 3 . At high levels of K, legislation is e¤ectively "blockaded" due to the excessive …xed cost of implementing it. As K falls, a point is reached where a small amount of unilateral action is su¢cient to preempt a tax, and industry …nds this action pro…table. As K falls further, proposing the tax becomes more attractive, so the level of unilateral action needed for preemption rises. Beyond a certain point, however, the requisite level of unilateral action becomes too expensive, and industry is unwilling to undertake it. This is shown in the …gure where there is a sharp, discontinuous, drop in unilateral activity.
Our analysis of self-regulation has implications for welfare as well as for industry behavior.
Indeed, throughout our analysis we have assumed that the industry is able to coordinate in …ghting a tax proposal and in taking unilateral action that would preempt the tax. An important policy question is whether such cooperation should be allowed. The answer turns on whether W (;; µ ¡¿ ) > ¹ W (¿ ¤ ; µ) ¡ K; i.e., whether welfare is higher when the industry's unilateral action preempts the tax proposal or when the industry takes no unilateral action and the regulator proposes the optimal tax. We address this question in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Expected social welfare is higher when unilateral industry action preempts government action, i.e., when W (;;
Proof. By de…nition, preemption occurs when W (;; µ ¡¿ ) > W (¿ ¤ ; µ ¡¿ ) ¡ K: Di¤erentiating expected welfare from the tax with respect to µ v , we …nd that
The …rst two terms are less than or equal to zero for all µ v > µ 
The proposition shows that unilateral action enhances social welfare. As shown in the proof, expected welfare with the tax increases with unilateral abatement, so self-regulation raises the welfare level that the regulator can claim by proposing a tax. If the regulator allows the tax proposal to be preempted, it must be the case that welfare is even higher under preemption than it would be if the tax were imposed when there is no unilateral action.
Given this, public policy ought to consider encouraging unilateral voluntary agreements by shielding them from antitrust prosecution.
Given that self-regulation enhances welfare, it is important to examine how public VAs a¤ect the incentives for industry to undertake unilateral actions. This is the focus of our …nal proposition.
Proposition 5 Public voluntary agreements reduce the industry's incentives to engage in preemptive self-regulation, and consequently may reduce social welfare.
Proof. Consider …rst a reference case in which the regulator commits not to o¤er a VA.
Then the preemptive level of unilateral adoption is µ v = µ ¡¿ (K); where the latter is de…ned
Consider a K such that the industry is just indi¤erent between taking preemptive unilateral action and taking no action at all. Now compare this reference case to one in which the regulator makes available a VA if the tax proposal fails.
By Proposition 2, the presence of the VA lowers social welfare if the tax elasticity of political resistance is high enough; let us assume this to be the case. Now note that the introduction of the VA raises the expected pro…tability of taking no unilateral action by the amount
Thus, the introduction of the VA makes unilateral action unpro…table. But by assumption, it also reduces expected social welfare in the event that preemption does not occur. Thus, the availability of the VA program reduces social welfare.¥ The proposition shows that when the regulator is expected to o¤er a public VA in the absence of a tax, industry self-regulation may be discouraged, with negative e¤ects on social welfare. This result extends that of Proposition 2, which showed that making the VA available could reduce welfare in a setting where self-regulation is not possible. Proposition 5 goes on to show that the availability of the VA may induce industry to eschew self-regulation, and that this change in industry behavior can harm welfare. This conclusion is at odds with the conventional view of public VAs, which sees them as a more e¢cient instrument than traditional mandatory regulations, and hence something to be encouraged. We do not deny that this is possible in some circumstances, but we emphasize that it is not a general conclusion. It is clear that while industry may elect to take unilateral action to preempt the threat of a tax, it does not want to preempt the "threat" of a subsidy. Furthermore, we have shown that preemption is socially bene…cial. Hence, even if the public VA is strictly better than government inaction, it is possible for expected welfare to fall as the public VA preempts an industry-led unilateral VA, which could be even more bene…cial.
Conclusions
We have presented a model of environmentally-friendly technology adoption in which a broad array of instruments-unilateral industry actions, public voluntary agreements (VAs), and legislatively-imposed taxes-can be jointly considered. Previous work has often failed to distinguish carefully between unilateral and public voluntary agreements, and thus reaches misleading policy conclusions. In particular, it is often thought that voluntary agreements emerge only under pressure of strong legislative threats, and that public voluntary programs should be promoted as e¢cient instruments that can preempt clumsy, old-fashioned, taxes and/or standards. Our more general analysis reaches very di¤erent conclusions: public voluntary programs are often weak instruments that are used precisely because strong legislation is infeasible due to industry's political resistance. We argue that this view aptly characterizes the most numerous group of public voluntary programs in the US, namely those developed by the EPA for issues of global warming. Furthermore, we show that public VAs may reduce welfare by preempting unilateral VAs that would have been better.
We show that under ideal conditions (i.e., when government can costlessly raise funds for public voluntary programs and can pass e¢cient taxes without political resistance) taxation dominates public VAs because taxation has the power to induce ine¢cient …rms to exit the industry as well as the power to induce adoption of the environmental technology, while VAs can do only the latter. We are also skeptical of the value of public VAs in many settings where these ideal conditions do not hold, but we do identify conditions under which they are appropriate policy instruments. First, and most obviously, they are better than government inaction in cases where taxation is desirable but will not be proposed due to political resistance by industry. Second, they may be more e¢cient than taxation under certain conditions: if the cost of raising public funds is low, the cost of the environmental technology is modest, the cost of technology adoption does not vary greatly across …rms, and political resistance to taxation is high.
Unilateral action by industry may be undertaken in order to preempt taxation, and we show that if this occurs, then it increases social welfare. This result suggests that antitrust o¢cials should not prosecute business-led unilateral voluntary agreements. In addition, our welfare result suggests another danger of substituting public VAs for traditional regulation: industry will not undertake unilateral actions to preempt subsidy programs. By substituting the "threat" of a handout for the threat of a tax, regulators may inadvertently preempt socially bene…cial corporate self-regulation.
A Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Lemma 4 Industry losses are increasing in ¿:
Proof. The general expression for industry losses, when unilateral self-regulation is allowed, is
where © (x; y)is an indicator variable taking on the value 1 if x < y and 0 otherwise. If
Recalling (6) and (7), we see that all terms on the right hand side of (23) it follows from (2) and (9) that will cause the regulator to alter the optimal tax. Our goal is to identify the level of voluntary adoptions at which the government prefers to abandon a particular policy (either tax or VA) in favor of the inaction option, whose social value is given by (13) . Thus, we seek the levels of µ
the optimal tax when µ v = µ a imposes lower losses on industry than does the optimal tax when µ v = ¹ µ; hence inducing less political resistance and raising the probability the tax is
(rising in the number of voluntary adoptions) over the relevant range we can ensure
on the relevant range. From (15) and (16) we see that
If
the second term will be negative since P 0 (¢) < 0 and d¢=dµ v > 0;
as can be seen from (22 To establish the sign of dW (¿ ¤ ; µ v )=dµ v ; we note that
which, substituting in for the partial derivative of (15) can be rewritten as
Note that the second term is negative for°su¢ciently small. The …rst component of the …rst term is positive given our assumption that W (¿; µ v ) is concave in ¿ and our result in lemma 2, which shows that ¿ ¤ falls short of the welfare-maximizing level due to political resistance. Thus, we see that
To establish the sign of @¿ ¤ =@µ v ;observe that by totally di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition governing the choice of ¿ ¤ we obtain
and therefore d¿
Since ¹ W (¿ ¤ ; µ v ) is concave, we see that the denominator of (28) It is straightforward to show that all terms in the large square brackets on the second and third lines of (29) are positive. Furthermore, we know P 0 (¢) < 0 and P 00 (¢) < 0;so The following lemma, along with Proposition 3, addresses the desirability of engaging in a unilateral voluntary agreement under the threat of taxation. In this case all …rms that would adopt under the optimal tax have already adopted unilaterally. The impact of further unilateral adoption can be analyzed by examining
Observe …rst that both
and
are increasing as µ 
Proof of Proposition 3
Industry pro…ts under unilateral preemptive action are
For large enough K, the public VA will be not be o¤ered because its bene…ts are less than its costs; let us de…ne the value of K such that the regulator is just indi¤erent to o¤ering the VA as K ¡s : Then for K > K ¡s , the VA is not o¤ered and expected pro…ts with no unilateral action are
The bene…t of preemption is the di¤erence between (35) and (34),
The terms inside the square brackets represent savings to the industry if the tax is preempted. They consist of several parts: some …rms are not forced to exit the industry, some do not have to pay the tax, and some are not forced to adopt the technology. The …nal term, which is not in brackets, re ‡ects the di¤erence between the level of adoption required to preempt, and the level that would be required under the voluntary agreement; this term may in principle be either positive or negative.
As K increases, so does µ ¡¿ ; thereby reducing the direct cost of preemption by lowering the requisite level of unilateral adoption. Since the expression in (36) is continuous in K , there exists some K that makes preemption pro…table. 
